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Abstract 
This paper shows that randomness can be an artefact of the 
methods used to examine firm performance. It questions the recent 
equating of entrepreneurship with gambling based on the 
assumption of random firm performance. It shows that complexity 
science provides a useful alternative perspective on randomness in 
relation to firm performance. 
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1. Introduction 
 
The debate about firm growth and randomness is longstanding, having been initiated 
by Gibrat in 1931 (Gibrat, 1931). It has received contributions from a diverse set of 
luminaries, including Kalecki (1945) and Dosi (2007). A useful recent addition to this 
debate has been made by Coad et al. (2013) when setting out Gambler’s Ruin Theory 
(GRT) in which firm performance is explicitly equated with coin-flipping and 
entrepreneurship with gambling.  
 
A central motivation for GRT is these authors’ view that several decades of research 
has failed to explain more than about 15 percent of the variation in firm performance 
(Storey, 2011, p.309-310; Coad, 2009, p.97-98). Their logic is that, because there has 
been so little success in identifying the resource factors associated with firm 
performance this means that such factors do not affect firm performance. 
 
In this paper we explore this view. We show that randomness can be an artefact of 
methodological procedure by presenting an alternative analysis employing an 
alternative dataset and measure of firm performance. We set out crucial distinctions 
between indeterminism on the one hand and deterministic chaos on the other, and 
between risk and uncertainty. We begin below by describing GRT as set out by Coad 
et al. (2013). 
 
2. Gambler’s Ruin Theory 
 
Coad et al. (2013) examine data for 2,184 firms started in the same quarter of 2004 
and surviving for four subsequent years. They categorise these firms as either 
‘growing’ or ‘declining’ depending on whether their sales-revenue growth is above or 
below that of the median firm for the year in question. Reducing firm performance to 
the two categories of ‘growth’ or ‘decline’ in this way facilitates comparison against 
the random benchmark of coin-flipping.  
 
For four consecutive flips of a fair coin there are sixteen different possible sequences 
of outcomes. Following this analogy, over a period of four years there are also sixteen 
possible ‘growth paths’ (Fig. 1), each of them occurring approximately 6.25% of the 
time if firm growth is random. The occurrence of the growth paths in the analysis 
offered by Coad et al.(2013) is sufficiently close to the coin-flipping benchmark of 
6.25% for the authors to conclude that growth occurs in an approximately random 
fashion. 
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   INSERT FIG. 1 ABOUT HERE 
 
However, using the median sales revenue in this way results in negligible differences 
between firms categorised as ‘growing’ and ‘declining’ and, therefore, a misleading 
impression of randomness. In the first year of Coad et al.’s (2013) analysis the median 
sales revenue is just £39,276 and between year 1 and year 2 the median growth of 
sales revenue is just 6%. Therefore, if the firm with the median sales revenue in year 1 
grew at the median growth rate between year 1 and year 2 its sales revenue in year 2 
would be £41,633 and it would be considered a ‘growing’ firm in year 2. However, if 
it instead only grows its sales revenue by 5.9% between year 1 and year 2, or from 
£39,276 to £41,593, the firm would instead be considered to be a ‘declining’ firm in 
year 2 – yet the difference between the two is just £40. 
 
Sales revenue is an ambiguous indicator of performance because its volatility can be 
representative of trivial, ephemeral changes in firm performance (Davidsson et al., 
2009, p.389). While all measures have disadvantages, employment growth is arguably 
more representative of genuine, long-lasting changes in performance and is less 
subject to volatility (Garnsey et al., 2006). It is easier to compare than are sales 
figures and is generally taken as the standard measure of firm growth (OECD, 2002; 
Davidsson et al., 2009). 
 
Reducing firm performance to just two categories using sales revenue as an indicator 
removes the third possible growth outcome of ‘stasis’, or no change in performance. 
In the subsequent analysis, we instead use change in employment as the indicator of 
performance to show that the randomness identified by Coad et al. (2013) is an 
artefact of a measurement approach designed to eliminate stasis as a growth outcome. 
 
3. Data and analysis 
 
3.1 Data 
 
The Beta Model (TBM) is a database of 2.6m UK firms whose creation, performance 
(in terms of employment change) and survival have been tracked over a ten-year 
period. The existence of a firm is registered on the database through its entry in one of 
two (or both) major UK business directories, The Yellow Pages or Thomson Local. 
Because of this method of data capture, the point at which the firm’s existence is 
captured is closer to its actual inception than in the official VAT data and the problem 
of so-called ‘left truncation’ (Yang and Aldrich, 2012) is reduced. For this reason, in 
2010 TBM had 2.6m firms registered on it compared to the UK government’s VAT 
dataset which had approximately 1.5m. The cohort of firms examined in the following 
analysis is for the fourth quarter of 2005, during which 79,427 firms were created 
across the UK. A total of 39,825 of these survive for four subsequent years to become 
part of this analysis of employment ‘growth paths’. 
 
3.2 Analysis 
 
If, like Coad et al. (2013), we exclude from the 39,825 firms any firm with a period of 
stasis (no change in employment) in any of the four years under analysis, we are left 
with just 187 firms. From 39,825 firms 39,638, or 99.5%, have at least one period of 
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stasis over the four-year period. If we instead include stasis as an additional category, 
the number of possible ‘growth paths’ increases from sixteen to eighty-one as shown 
in Table 1. 
 
INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE 
 
Table 1 shows that, when using employment change as the measure of firm 
performance, and when including stasis as a specific category of outcome, firm 
growth is decidedly not random. 56% of firms have a growth path characterised by 
four consecutive periods of stasis. Of the other growth paths, those which are 
dominated by stasis (i.e. those including three periods of stasis) tend to be followed 
by a larger percentage of firms (around 1-5%) than those dominated by either growth 
or decline. Given this dominance of stasis as a growth outcome, it is not legitimate to 
exclude it from the analysis by focussing on negligible changes in sales revenue 
simply in order to facilitate a comparison with coin flipping. This illustrates the extent 
to which randomness can be an artefact of method. We next consider the issue of 
randomness from a complexity science perspective.  
 
4. A complexity perspective 
 
4.1 Indeterminism and deterministic chaos 
 
Complexity science can provide an explanation for the perceived failure of decades of 
research to identify factors associated with firm performance. This explanation is 
based on the crucial distinction between indeterminism and deterministic chaos. 
 
Indeterminism implies an absence of cause, and therefore an absence of agency. By 
contrast, under deterministic chaos outcomes have causes but these are initially so 
small that we cannot measure them and for convenience they may be called random 
(Byrne, 2002). A chaotic system exhibits long periods of stability (or stasis) 
punctuated by sudden qualitative changes as a result of amplified positive feedback 
originating in these initially small causes, leading to ‘path dependence’. Envisaging 
firms as Complex Adaptive Systems subject to deterministic chaos provides an 
explanation for the path dependence and stasis exhibited by the firms in Table 1. 
 
The perceived failure to identify factors associated with firm performance sufficiently 
to allow prediction is reflective of deterministic chaos in firm performance and not 
indeterminism as Coad et al. (2013) imply. Gambling is reflective of indeterminism 
and is not, therefore, an appropriate analogy for entrepreneurship. 
 
4.2 Risk and uncertainty 
 
The related distinction between risk and uncertainty also suggests that gambling is not 
an appropriate analogy for entrepreneurship. Risk exists where it is possible to 
calculate the probability of a particular outcome. An example is the throwing of a fair 
die with six sides, for which all possible outcomes are known, and for which the 
probability of each is therefore calculable and equal to 1/6. Coin-flipping also falls 
into this category of processes. 
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By contrast, uncertainty exists where it is not possible to calculate probabilities for 
particular outcomes, perhaps because a full set of possible outcomes is not known, or 
because of the absence of an appropriate reference class of events of the same type. 
Each new firm represents a variation in a business model, implemented in a 
constantly varying economic context, by an entrepreneur with idiosyncratic 
knowledge and skills. The creation of a new firm is therefore representative of 
uncertainty, not risk as in gambling. 
 
Because they deal with uncertainty not risk, entrepreneurs adopt ‘effectuation’ 
strategies - iterative processes of matching the firm’s internal resources to constantly 
evolving external opportunities - leading to improvisation and adaptation (Sarasvathy, 
2001). While this does not imply that entrepreneurs are fully in control of outcomes, 
it does imply that they have some influence over them. Opportunities may arise 
randomly, but skill and agency are present in the iterative process of matching 
resources to them as they arise. This contrasts with the implication drawn by Coad et 
al. (2013, p.7) that entrepreneurs have little or no agency and are simply ‘corks 
[bobbing] in a sea [of chance] driven by a range of factors beyond their control’. 
 
5. Summary 
 
A central motivation of GRT is its originators’ perception that several decades of 
research has failed to identify the factors associated with firm performance, allowing 
for the prediction of growth and decline. However, as shown by May (1976), even in 
a deterministic model in which all parameters are correctly and fully specified 
outcomes still appear random and prediction is impossible. In complexity science this 
is known as deterministic chaos. 
 
We therefore have two competing explanations for purportedly random outcomes in 
relation to entrepreneurship. The first is that it is an indeterminate process equivalent 
to gambling. The second is that it is a deterministic process involving the iterative 
matching of internal firm resources to external opportunities, requiring entrepreneurial 
skill and effort but subject to deterministic chaos rendering prediction impossible. 
 
The first interpretation is not only incorrect, it is counter-productive. It implies that 
there is little to be gained by further research effort other than to understand how 
policy can better facilitate entrepreneurs’ gambling by reducing the costs of business 
failure, thereby shortening the length of time between gambles (Storey, 2011). The 
second explanation, by contrast, offers a large number of fruitful avenues for further 
research, but requires a whole new set of methods and theoretical logic. 
 
It is indeed impossible to predict the growth and decline of new and small firms as the 
originators of GRT imply. However, this is not because running a new firm is 
analogous to gambling, it is because the performance of new firms is subject to 
deterministic chaos. This does not imply that variations in firm resources and 
entrepreneurial skill do not affect performance. 
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Figure 1: Possible outcomes from a sequence of four years of firm growth or decline 
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Table 1: Growth paths for 39,825 firms started in 2005 and surviving four years 
Growth Path No. of firms % of firms Growth Path No. of firms % of firms 
D-D-D-D 1 0.00% G-G-D-S 40 0.10% 
D-D-S-D 1 0.00% S-D-G-D 44 0.11% 
D-D-D-G 2 0.01% D-S-S-D 60 0.15% 
S-D-D-D 2 0.01% G-S-D-G 65 0.16% 
G-G-G-G 3 0.01% S-G-S-G 66 0.17% 
G-D-D-D 3 0.01% D-S-G-G 68 0.17% 
D-G-G-G 3 0.01% D-G-S-D 69 0.17% 
D-S-D-D 5 0.01% G-D-S-G 79 0.20% 
D-G-D-D 5 0.01% D-D-G-S 80 0.20% 
S-G-G-G 5 0.01% D-S-D-S 83 0.21% 
G-G-D-D 5 0.01% D-G-D-S 86 0.22% 
G-G-G-D 7 0.02% S-G-G-S 94 0.24% 
G-D-D-G 8 0.02% G-S-S-G 106 0.27% 
G-G-S-G 8 0.02% G-D-G-S 110 0.28% 
S-D-D-G 9 0.02% D-S-G-D 112 0.28% 
S-G-D-D 12 0.03% S-S-D-G 123 0.31% 
G-G-D-G 13 0.03% D-D-S-S 129 0.32% 
G-D-G-G 14 0.04% S-D-S-G 130 0.33% 
D-D-D-S 14 0.04% G-G-S-S 148 0.37% 
G-G-G-S 18 0.05% G-S-G-S 156 0.39% 
D-G-G-D 18 0.05% S-S-G-G 157 0.39% 
D-G-D-G 18 0.05% S-G-S-D 172 0.43% 
G-S-G-G 19 0.05% G-S-S-D 246 0.62% 
D-S-D-G 19 0.05% D-S-S-G 253 0.64% 
G-S-D-D 21 0.05% S-D-G-S 263 0.66% 
D-G-S-G 23 0.06% S-G-D-S 277 0.70% 
D-D-S-G 25 0.06% S-S-G-D 341 0.86% 
G-D-G-D 26 0.07% G-S-D-S 385 0.97% 
D-G-G-S 26 0.07% D-G-S-S 413 1.04% 
S-S-D-D 26 0.07% G-D-S-S 432 1.08% 
S-G-G-D 26 0.07% D-S-G-S 614 1.54% 
G-D-D-S 27 0.07% S-S-S-D 780 1.96% 
S-D-G-G 28 0.07% S-S-D-S 845 2.12% 
D-D-G-D 29 0.07% S-D-S-S 887 2.23% 
G-D-S-D 29 0.07% S-S-S-G 1162 2.92% 
D-D-G-G 32 0.08% S-G-S-S 1254 3.15% 
G-G-S-D 33 0.08% S-S-G-S 1960 4.92% 
S-D-S-D 33 0.08% D-S-S-S 2161 5.43% 
S-D-D-S 38 0.10% G-S-S-S 2199 5.52% 
S-G-D-G 39 0.10% S-S-S-S 22463 56.40% 
G-S-G-D 40 0.10% Grand Total 39825 100% 
 
G=Growth; S=Stasis (no change); D=Decline 
 
